EFFECT OF THE GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION PROGRAM TO THE CROP INSURANCE PARTICIPATION LEVEL by Rachman,  Muhammad Ibrahim et al.
Copyright © 2021, ISSN: 1693-5853/E-ISSN: 2407-2524 1
Accredited  SINTA 2 
by Directorate General of Higher Education (DGHE), 
Republic of Indonesia No 36/E/KPT/2019
Jurnal Manajemen & Agribisnis, Vol. 18 No. 1, March 2021
Permalink/DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.17358/jma.18.1.1
Available online at http://journal.ipb.ac.id/index.php/jmagr
1 Corresponding author: 
  Email: muhammad.ibrahim@sbm-itb.ac.id
EFFECT OF THE GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION PROGRAM TO THE CROP 
INSURANCE PARTICIPATION LEVEL
Muhammad Ibrahim Rachman*)1, Nunung Nuryartono**), Bustanul Arifin***), and 
Toni Bakhtiar****) 
*) School of Business, IPB University
Jl. Pajajaran, Bogor 16151, Indonesia
**)Department of Economics, Faculty of Economics and Management, IPB University
Jl. Lingkar Akademik, Dramaga Campus, Bogor 16680, Indonesia 
***) Department of Agricultural Economics, Faculty of Agriculture, University of Lampung
Jl. Prof. Dr. Ir. Sumantri Brojonegoro, Lampung 35141, Indonesia
****) Faculty of Mathematics and Science, Department of Mathematics, IPB University
Jl. Meranti, Dramaga Campus, Bogor 16680, Indonesia
Abstract: In addition to premium subsidies, Indonesia's government implements other 
intervention programs as a stimulus to boost farmers’ participation in Rice Farmers Business 
Insurance (AUTP). Therefore, this study aimed to investigate the effect of the government 
intervention program in 2019 that requires participation in AUTP as a prerequisite for 
redeeming subsidized fertilizer. This study also aimed to ascertain the socioeconomic 
factors that influence farmers to participate. Meanwhile, primary data were obtained through 
questionnaires distributed from March 23 to April 6, 2020, and completed by 103 farmers in 
14 villages in Sliyeg, Indramayu. The data were analyzed with McNemar Test to determine 
the effect of farmers’ participation in AUTP when the government intervention program was 
implemented and terminated. Furthermore, Logistic Regression Analysis is used to ascertain 
the socioeconomic factors that influence farmers to participate. The result showed that the 
program affects their participation in AUTP. This level is higher when the program is enforced 
and decreased when terminated. The socio-economics variables that influenced farmers to 
participate in AUTP when implemented in the government program are land ownership status 
and land size, while only land size influenced them when terminated.
Keywords: agriculture risk, consumer behavior, government stimulus, participation rate, 
premium subsidy
Abstrak: Selain subsidi premi, pemerintah Indonesia melaksanakan program intervensi 
lainnya sebagai stimulus untuk mendorong partisipasi petani dalam Asuransi Usaha Petani 
Padi (AUTP). Oleh karena itu, penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui pengaruh program 
intervensi pemerintah tahun 2019 yang mensyaratkan partisipasi dalam AUTP sebagai 
prasyarat penebusan pupuk bersubsidi. Penelitian ini juga bertujuan untuk mengetahui faktor 
sosial ekonomi yang mempengaruhi petani untuk berpartisipasi. Sedangkan data primer 
diperoleh melalui penyebaran kuesioner sejak 23 Maret hingga 6 April 2020 kepada 103 petani 
di 14 desa di Sliyeg, Indramayu. Data dianalisis dengan Uji McNemar untuk mengetahui 
pengaruh partisipasi petani dalam AUTP ketika program intervensi pemerintah dilaksanakan 
dan dihentikan. Selanjutnya, Analisis Regresi Logistik digunakan untuk mengetahui faktor-
faktor sosial ekonomi yang mempengaruhi petani untuk berpartisipasi. Hasil penelitian 
menunjukkan bahwa program mempengaruhi partisipasi mereka dalam AUTP. Tingkat ini 
lebih tinggi saat program diterapkan dan menurun saat dihentikan. Selain itu, variabel sosial 
ekonomi yang mempengaruhi petani untuk berpartisipasi saat program dilaksanakan adalah 
status kepemilikan tanah dan luas lahan, sedangkan hanya luas lahan yang mempengaruhi 
petani saat program dihentikan.
Kata kunci: perilaku konsumen, risiko pertanian, subsidi premi, stimulus pemerintah, tingkat 
partisipasi 
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INTRODUCTION
Rice is one of the most widely consumed grains globally, 
and Indonesia is the 4th highest consumer after China, 
India, and Bangladesh. According to USDA (2020), in 
August 2020, Indonesia consumed 35.4 million metric 
tons (MT) of rice, a 0.3% increase from the previous 
month. For the last four years, consumption has been 
decreased by 6%. In 2016/17, it was 37.5 million MT 
and slowly decreased to 37.0 million MT in 2017/18, 
36.3 million MT in 2018/19 and 35.5 million MT in 
2019/20. In 2020/21, FAO (2020) forecasted that the 
world rice utilization would be expanded by 1.6%, and 
Asia, including Indonesia, is envisaged to drive the 
food-use expansion. In addition to population growth, 
the implementation of state assistance programs geared 
towards access to rice by vulnerable consumers could 
further boost intake. This would mainly be the case in 
countries such as Bangladesh, Indonesia and especially 
India, where ample state reserves may encourage 
officials to extend the duration of expanded publicly 
subsidized distribution schemes or open market sales 
launched in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Furthermore, Indonesia is different from the other 
top three countries because of lower production than 
national consumption. As of August 2020, 34.9 million 
MT of rice was produced, which is 1% lower than 
the national consumption (USDA 2020). The outlook 
is projected to be more negative in 2020, which was 
forecasted to experience erratic rains and delayed 
plantings and lower output below the already reduced 
2019 level (FAO, 2020). Meanwhile, Indonesia could 
witness the largest import increase, as greater market 
intervention needs by the government. In the context 
of the COVID-19 outbreak, successive production 
contractions could sway officials to recur to imports 
to reconstitute reserves. Also, environmental risk, 
especially climate change, is one of the biggest 
challenges because it causes a shift in weather patterns 
which is a threat to the food production process.
Furthermore, climate change affects crop yields by 
decreasing productivity (Perdinan et al. 2008, Surmaini 
et al. 2011). The current system of national rice 
production is vulnerable to climate change. Also, rice 
production is predicted to decrease by around 20-30% 
in 2030 (A et al. 1996). Besides, climate uncertainties 
such as floods, drought, and pests can have an impact, 
both directly and indirectly, on the level of crop failure 
(PSEKP, 2012). 
One way to manage risk in agriculture is through the 
implementation of crop insurance (Kahan, 2008). This 
has been widely applied in many countries in favor of 
small farmers. The lessons emerging from the review 
of crop insurance in various countries are that some 
forms are not necessary for encouraging the growth of 
farm production, and the government support in this 
endeavor is unavoidable (Pasaribu, 2010). Despite 
the existing subsidies, price, and other policies that 
improve farmers' terms of trade, access to inputs 
and markets, policies responding to risks are clearly 
lacking. In response to that condition, the government 
(GoI) implement crop insurance as one of the programs 
mandated by Law Number 19 of 2013 regarding 
Farmer Protection and Empowerment. To carry out this 
mandate, the GoI launched a program known as Rice 
Farmers Business Insurance (AUTP) in 2015. In the 
implementation, the GoI through the Ministry of State-
Owned Enterprises then appointed PT Asuransi Jasa 
Indonesia (Persero), a state-owned enterprise, as the 
administrator. The benefit of this program is to protect 
for one planting season to paddy farmers with a sum 
insured of IDR6 million per hectare and a premium of 
IDR180,000. Considering that the premium paid by 
farmers might be too expensive, the GoI then provided 
premium subsidies of 80% for farmers to only pay 
IDR36,000. Although the government provided a 
substantial premium subsidy to increase participation in 
AUTP, since its launch, farmers' interest to participate 
is still low. Until 2019, the target of 1 million lands 
protected by the AUTP set by the GoI each year has 
not been achieved. This target only saves around 6% of 
Indonesia's total agricultural land, which amounts to 15 
million hectares.
Table 1. Land protected by AUTP, 2015 - May 2020








May 2020 333,505 33.3%
Source: PT Asuransi Jasa Indonesia (Persero) (June 2020), 
recalculated. 
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Literature suggests the existence of a positive, although 
inelastic, effect of the subsidy level on demand for crop 
insurance (Goodwin et al. 2004, Lavorato et al. 2019). 
Meanwhile, higher premium subsidies induce more 
insurance coverage, lowering farmers' risk (Yu et al. 
2017). Also, changes in support may only impact the 
level of total premiums and liabilities per hectare, but 
not the farmer participation level (O'Donoghue, 2014). 
Therefore, to maintain high participation and coverage 
levels, the government premium subsidies would need 
to be higher in riskier farm areas (Yi et al. 2016), 
leading to the adverse-selection issue.
Regarding how much is the suitable figure of premium 
subsidies, most farmers will not pay even close to 
actuarially fair premium rates for crop insurance because 
they believe they can effectively use the funds in other 
ways (Smith, 2016). The study conducted by Babcock 
et al. (2004) showed that even when 65% premiums 
are actuarially fair, 75% are still too high for most 
farmers, leading to higher government spending for the 
subsidies. In the US, the federal crop insurance program 
has risen to the point that it is the most expensive form 
of intervention in agricultural markets due to the high 
premium subsidies (Goodwin and Smith, 2013). The 
federal crop insurance program could induce welfare 
loss because it undermines economic efficiency (Ye et 
al.  2009). However, premium subsidies do not always 
cause farmers to produce more output (Ye et al. 2009), 
and it is not different in Indonesia. Even though the 
subsidies are high, the effect on the crop insurance 
participation level is still low. Farmers even demand 
higher premium subsidies than the current scheme 
(Ambarawati, 2018).
In addition to providing these subsidies, in specific 
periods, the GoI also integrated other programs with 
AUTP, such as subsidized fertilizer and a high-quality 
seed program positioned as an intervention action. In 
those programs, farmers are required to participate in 
AUTP as a condition. However, despite those efforts, 
their interest is still low. Therefore, To investigate 
the characteristics of farmers who participate and 
those that do not, studies were conducted to analyze 
the socio-economic factors that determine farmers' 
participation in crop insurance (Siswadi and Syakir, 
2016; Azriani et al. 2018; Marphy and Priminingtyas, 
2019). However, those studies only acknowledge the 
first layer intervention, the premium subsidies, without 
considering other GoI program's effects as the second 
layer.
This study fills the research gap of not considering 
the GoI program as the second layer intervention. 
Therefore, this study aimed to investigate the effect of 
the GoI programs that require participation in AUTP 
as a prerequisite for redeeming subsidized fertilizer 
implemented in 2019. The GoI program stopped in 
2020, which led to a decrease in farmer participation. 
Furthermore, this study aimed to investigate the effect 
of a government intervention program on AUTP 
participation level and ascertain the socio-economic 
factors that influence farmers to participate when 
the program is implemented and when it is not. This 
research was conducted in the Sliyeg subdistrict, 
Indramayu Regency, West Java. This province is the 
2nd largest national rice granary, with Indramayu as 
the highest contributor. Meanwhile, Sliyeg is one of the 
highest rice producers in Indramayu, with a population 
of 58,454, and 15% of them are paddy farmers, which 
makes it fit for this research.
METHODS
The population of this study was 8,597 paddy 
farmers in Sliyeg (BPS, 2018). This study used a 
descriptive approach through primary data obtained by 
questionnaires distributed to 110 farmers of landowners 
and tenants in 14 villages in Sliyeg as the unit of analysis. 
Furthermore, samples were taken by the purposive 
sampling method, and respondent determining was 
conducted by simple random sampling. Meanwhile, 
filling out the questionnaire was carried out from 
March 23 to April 6, 2020, using the direct interview 
method. The total number of returned and completed 
questionnaires were 103. The respondents were asked 
if they have ever participated in AUTP and whether 
they still participated when terminated the government 
program.
First, the farmer’s participation in AUTP will be 
processed using Multiple Regression Analysis to 
investigate the influence of the farmers’ socio-
economic as independent variables to farmers’ AUTP 
participation experience as the dependent variables as 
pictured in Figure 1. The hypothesis for this test is that all 
independent variables, individually or simultaneously, 
influence the dependent variables and the test will use 
the following formula: 
Y=β0+β1X1+β2X2 + ... β8X8+ε
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where Y is farmers’ AUTP buying experience whether 
ever or never bought AUTP and X1 until X8 are the 
farmers’ socio-economic consist of age, sex, level of 
education, marital status, number of dependents, land 
ownership status, farming experience and land size. 
The data were then processed using the McNemar Test 
with the following formula:
χ2=(|Α-D|-1)2/(A+D)
Where A and D were the change of behavior when 
enforced the GoI program and after termination. The 
objective of the McNemar Test is to determine whether 
there was an effect of farmers' participation in AUTP 
when implemented the GoI program and when it was 
terminated with the following hypothesis:
H0 : There is no effect on participation level with and 
without a government program.
H1 : There is an effect on participation level with and 
without a government program.
The decision-making criteria for the McNemar test 
was as follows: If calculated Z < Z table and significant 
value > 0.05 then H0 is accepted; If calculated Z > Z 
table and significant value < 0.05 then H0 is rejected.
Meanwhile, ascertain the socio-economic factors that 
influence farmers to participate or not in the AUTP 
with or without GoI program,
 1,if participate in AUTP
 0,if not participate in AUTP
Logistic Regression Analysis then used given by:
logit(ρ)=ln(ρ/(1-ρ))=β0+β1 X1+β2 X2+...β8 X8
X1 until X8 are the farmers’ socio-economic consist of 
age, sex, level of education, marital status, number of 
dependents, land ownership status, farming experience 
and land size. Age and land size variables are those with 
ratio data types used to facilitate the analysis results' 
interpretation. The categories created is seen in the 
descriptive statistics section. Also, the interpretation 
used in the logit regression model was to use the odds 
ratio, and the SPSS output was displayed in the [exp(β)] 
column. The odds ratio explains how many increases or 
decreases in the farmer's probability to participate in 
the AUTP program when the value of the independent 
variable (X) changes by a certain value.
RESULTS
Socio-economics Characteristics of the 
Respondents
The socio-economic characteristics of farmers were 
used as indicators of their ability to carry out economic 
activities. The descriptive statistics in Table 3 showed 
the respondents are mostly male in the productive 
age with the age range of 40-49 and 50-59. Most of 
the respondents are married with 2 to 4 dependents. 
Furthermore, 42% have completed high school, and 
41% only completed elementary education. Almost 
all respondents have more than five years of farming 
experience and are mostly landowners with 1 hectare 
or less.
The result in Table 4 shows that the only farmers' socio-
economics characteristics that significantly influenced 
the participation in AUTP are land ownership status. 
This condition might have happened because the 
insurance company will only cover the land in one 
expanse regardless of the farmer's characteristics. 
Every farmer will have peer pressure to participate in 
AUTP if the majority of the expanse is participating.
{
Figure 1. Research framework
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics
Variable Category Total Percentage (%)
Age < 30 2 1.9
30 - 39 10 9.7
40 - 49 37 35.9
50 - 59 37 35.9
≥ 60 17 16.5





Junior High 20 19.4






















1-5 years 7 6.8
>5 years 96 93.2
Land Size  
(ha)
<= 0,5 45 43.7
>0,5 – 1 42 40.8
>1 – 1.5 4 3.9
1.5 – 2 8 7.8
> 2 2 1.9
Table 4. Multiple Regression result of participation in 
AUTP





Level of Education -0.17 -1.44
Marital Status -0.04 -0.37
No. of Dependent -0.09 -0.88
Land Ownership Status -0.21 -2.05 *
Farming Experience -0.09 -0.94
Land Size 0.17 1.53
The symbol (*) in the Sig. column indicates a variable that 
has a significant effect on the error level of 10%, i.e. the 
p-value is smaller than 0.10.
Effect of the Government Program on the AUTP 
Participation
Data from the questionnaires (Table 5) were converted 
to the following format for McNemar test (Table 6). 
From the test, the result of the calculated Z was 24.083 
with a significance value of 0%, while Z table was 3.841 
with a significance value of 5% and df = 1.  As the 
calculated Z > Z table and significant value < 0.05, then 
H0 is rejected. Hence, there is an effect in participation 
level with and without a government program. 
Analysis of Participation in AUTP with Government 
Program
From the logistic regression analysis, based on the 
results in the Table 7, two independent variables have 
a significant influence on AUTP participation when 
enforced the government program. These variables are 
Land Ownership Status and Land Size for the category 
of >1.5 – 2 hectares.
Land Ownership Status
This variable has two categories, which are land 
tenants and landowners. The odds ratio [exp(β)] of 
this variable is 0.31 which can be interpreted that the 
landowners have a 31% lower possibility to participate 
in AUTP when the government program was enforced. 
Meanwhile, land tenant farmers have a 3.2 times higher 
probability of participating when the program was 
enforced.












Table 6. McNemar Test Result
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the land size variable >1.5 – 2 hectares is 21.77. This 
means farmers with >1.5 – 2 hectares of land have a 
2,177% (21.77 times) higher probability of participating 
when stopped the government program than those with 
a land size of 0.5 hectares and below.
The Effect of Government Program to Stimulate 
Farmer Participation in AUTP
Based on the result, the government intervention 
program and crop insurance premium subsidy are proven 
to have a positive and significant effect of stimulating 
farmer participation in AUTP. Hence, it could be 
stated that the premium subsidy alone is not sufficient 
to boost participation. The government also needs to 
provide other intervention programs to complement 
the premium subsidy to increase the participation rate. 
Studies about the effect of the intervention program in 
addition to crop insurance premium subsidy have not 
been conducted. Therefore, considering the premium 
subsidy and other programs are part of the public 
intervention, this research confirmed the previous study 
conducted by Goodwin et al. (2004) and Lavorato et 
al. (2019) that showed premium subsidy has a positive 
effect on the crop insurance demand. In line with the 
positive impact, it is unavoidable that farmers will 
demand a higher subsidy than the current scheme, as 
confirmed by Ambarawati (2018). Also, According to 
Smith (2016), farmers believe that they can use the 
funds they pay for the insurance effectively in other 
ways. Meanwhile, a study conducted by Babcock et 
al. (2004) showed that even when 65% of premiums 
are actuarially fair, 75% are still too high for most 
farmers. 
Hence, other intervention programs might be a good 
solution to avoid close to zero farmers' contribution 
to pay for the crop insurance premium. With this 
program, the government will help farmers to focus on 
risk and also productivity. Also, they need to see crop 
insurance as part of a comprehensive risk management 
framework to modernize agriculture. This should be 
promoted together with other basic agricultural services 
such as timely availability of inputs, extension services, 
and efficient marketing channels for the outputs. In 
the future, rather than increase the premium subsidy, 
it will be beneficial for the government to provide a 
complementary program to support the end-to-end 
production process and place crop insurance as an 
important component.
Table 7. Logistic Regression result of participation in 
AUTP with government program
Independent Variables β Exp(β) p -calc Sig.
Age
   (30-39) -20.01 0.00 0.99
   (40-49) -20.17 0.00 0.99
   (50-59) -20.63 0.00 0.99
   (>= 60) -20.41 0.00 0.99
Sex 0.47 1.59 0.68
Level of Education
   (SMP) -0.76 0.47 0.24
   (SMA) -0.70 0.49 0.24
Marital Status -0.21 0.81 0.89
No. of Dependent -0.19 0.82 0.27
Land Ownership Status -1.17 0.31 0.02 *
Farming Experience -1.09 0.34 0.27
Land Size (ha)
   (0.5 – 1) 0.77 2.16 0.14
   (>1 – 1.5) 0.79 2.22 0.49
   (>1.5 – 2) 2.09 8.15 0.03 *
   (> 2) 0.61 1.85 0.70
The symbol (*) in the Sig. column indicates a variable that 
has a significant effect on the error level of 10%, i.e. the 
p-value is smaller than 0.10.
Land Size of >1.5 – 2 hectares
The Land Size variable has five categories, and farmers 
with land size of 0.5 hectares and below are the basis 
of comparison. Meanwhile, the odds ratio [exp(β)] of 
the land size variable of 1.5 – 2 hectares is 8.15. This 
means that farmers with 1.5– 2 hectares of land have 
an 815% (8.15 times) higher possibility to participate 
compared to those with 0.5 hectares and below.
Analysis of Participation in AUTP without 
Government Program
Based on the results in the Table 8, there is only one 
independent variable that has a significant effect on 
AUTP participation when the government program 
was stopped, which is the Land Size for the category of 
more than 1.5 up to 2 hectares.
Land Size of  >1.5 – 2 hectares
The Land Size variable has five categories, and farmers 
with a land size of 0.5 hectares and below are the basis 
of comparison. Meanwhile, the odds ratio [exp(β)] of 
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coercive programs. An example of a government 
program that is encouraging or coercive is a program 
discussed in this research, namely by making AUTP 
a condition to redeem subsidized fertilizers. With the 
low level of crop insurance awareness and insurance in 
general, this research results proved that encouraging 
or coercive programs are effective to increase farmers' 
participation in AUTP. For this reason, the government 
needs to continue a similar program to increase 
farmers' awareness of crop insurance. When creating 
the program, refer to the findings from this research. 
The government should target land tenants with a land 
size of more than 1.5 up to 2 hectares as they have a 
higher awareness of crop insurance than others.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Conclusions
Based on the study findings, it can conclude that the 
GoI program that requires AUTP as a prerequisite 
for redeeming subsidized fertilizer affects farmers’ 
participation level. Meanwhile, this level is higher when 
the government program was enforced and decreased 
when it was terminated. The socio-economics variables 
that influence a farmer to participate in AUTP when 
enforced the government program are land ownership 
status, specifically for the tenant and land size for those 
with more than 1.5 up to 2 hectares of land. Furthermore, 
when terminated the program, the socio-economics 
variables that influence farmers to participate is the 
land size for those with more than 1.5 up to 2 hectares 
of land.
Recommendations
In studying the participation level, especially for a crop 
insurance product, research needs to investigate other 
intervention programs attached to the product to avoid 
bias. Furthermore, future research needs to compare 
the different intervention programs' effectiveness to the 
farmers’ participation level in crop insurance.
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Table 8. Logistic Regression result of participation in 
AUTP without GoI program
Independent Variables β Exp(β) p -calc Sig.
Age
   (30-39) -19.76 0.00 0.99
   (40-49) 0.80 2.24 0.76
   (50-59) -0.43 0.65 0.87
   (>= 60) -0.75 0.47 0.78
Sex -0.28 0.75 0.82
Education
   (SMP) -0.24 0.78 0.77
   (SMA) -0.96 0.38 0.24
Marital Status 0.19 1.21 0.95
No. of Dependent -0.38 0.68 0.14
Land Ownership Status -0.19 0.83 0.76
Farming Experience -0.89 0.41 0.42
Land Size (ha)
   (0.5 – 1) 0.47 1.60 0.51
   (>1 – 1.5) 0.48 1.62 0.73
   (>1.5 – 2) 3.08 21.77 0.01 *
   (> 2) 1.57 4.79 0.35
The symbol (*) in the Sig. column indicates a variable that 
has a significant effect on the error level of 10%, i.e. the 
p-value is smaller than 0.10.
The Socioeconomic Factors that Influence Farmers 
to Participate in AUTP
Previous studies conducted by Siswadi and Syakir 
(2016), Azriani et al. (2018), Marphy and Priminingtyas 
(2019) found that age, education, farming experience, 
income, farm group membership and land size are the 
factors that influence farmers to participate in AUTP. 
Although, their study did not consider the second 
layer government intervention program. This research 
confirmed that land size is one of the socio-economic 
factors that influence farmers to participate when the 
government program was enforced and terminated. 
Furthermore, it was found that land ownership status, 
specifically for the land tenant, is an influencer factor 
to participate in when the government program was 
enforced. From the result shown in Table 7 and Table 
8, we can also see that the influencers are not related to 
the farmer's personal attributes but more to the object 
of coverage, the land.
Managerial Implications
This study shows that the level of farmer participation 
in AUTP is influenced by the pull strategy, such 
as premium subsidy programs and encouraging or 
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